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Immigration was a major point of debate and disagreement in the United Kingdom 
(UK) during the 2016 Brexit referendum. Following three years of negotiations, the 
European Union (EU) and the UK came to an agreement – though not yet in force – 
on the protection of citizens' rights post-Brexit. This, however, covers only those EU 
nationals who come to the UK (and vice versa) before the UK's withdrawal from the 
EU. The future mobility framework is yet to be determined. This article discusses the 
citizens' rights negotiated by the parties and the possible mobility regimes for the future 
EU-UK relationship. It suggests that whatever future policy is chosen, it will, as the 
UK government insists, be far removed from the free movement notion under EU law. 
This is particularly the case in a no-deal Brexit scenario. 
Keywords: Brexit, European Union, withdrawal agreement, free movement 
of persons, mobility, citizens' rights, no-deal Brexit, GATS, Mode 4 mobility, 
Settlement Scheme  
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................. 118 
II. CITIZENS' RIGHTS UNDER THE WITHDRAWAL AGREEMENT ................... 120 
1. The Scope of Application of Citizens' Rights ......................................................... 121 
2. The Content of Citizens' Rights ............................................................................ 126 
3. The Institutional Framework ................................................................................ 128 
4. Implications of a No-Deal Brexit ......................................................................... 129 
III. THE FUTURE MOBILITY FRAMEWORK ........................................................ 132 
 
 Professor of European Union and Labour Law, Faculty of Law, University of 
Cambridge, and Trinity College, email: csb24@cam.ac.uk. 
 Research Associate, Faculty of Law, University of Cambridge, and Trinity College, 
email: em547@cam.ac.uk. 
† The authors are working with the 'UK in a Changing Europe' programme. They 
have been supported through ESRC funding ES/N015436/1. 
 
118 European Journal of Legal Studies  {Special Issue 
 
 
1. The Post-Brexit Immigration System: Introduction ............................................. 134 
2. Visitors ................................................................................................................... 136 
3. Workers ................................................................................................................... 137 
A. Skilled workers.......................................................................................... 137 
B. Workers at All Skills Levels ..................................................................... 139 
4. Other ..................................................................................................................... 140 
IV. INTERNATIONAL MOBILITY .........................................................................142 
1. Mobility under Mode 4 .......................................................................................... 142 
A. Mode 4 Access under GATS ................................................................... 143 
B. Mode 4 Access under Free Trade Agreements ..................................... 144 
C. UK's Mode 4 Access post-Brexit ........................................................... 148 
2. Most-Favoured-Nation Clause ............................................................................. 150 
V. CONCLUSIONS .................................................................................................. 152 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The European Union (EU) has insisted that withdrawal from membership of 
the EU under Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), like the 
process of accession to the EU, should follow a phased approach.1 The EU 
made clear that the Parties could not advance to the next phase of 
negotiations until the European Council had concluded that sufficient 
progress had been made in the previous phase. Ensuring citizens' rights – 
namely the rights of EU citizens already resident in the UK and UK citizens 
in the EU – was one of the three main issues for first phase of negotiations, 
the other two being the so-called Brexit bill and the Northern Ireland 
border.2  
While immigration was a major point of debate and disagreement in the UK 
during the campaign leading up to the 2016 referendum, reaching a consensus 
 
1 See Jones in this issue. 
2 European Council, 'Guidelines following the United Kingdom's notification under 
Article 50' (29 April 2017) EUCO XT 20004/17. 
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with the EU on citizens' rights in fact proved easier than might have been 
expected. However, Phase I of the negotiations – which ultimately led to the 
25 November 2018 Withdrawal Agreement (WA) – were limited to the 
protection of the rights already acquired by EU citizens prior to withdrawal 
and, potentially, also those during the transition period (also called the 
'implementation period' by the UK government). Importantly, the WA (or 
any other withdrawal agreement, should the Parties decide to re-negotiate) 
does not provide for 'onward' free movement rights, that is, rights applicable 
to UK nationals living in one EU state who, after the transition period or after 
the withdrawal date, want to move to another EU State. This is considered 
to be an issue to be dealt with under any future trade negotiations and thus a 
separate agreement on the future relationship3 which is covered by Phase II 
of the negotiations. A 'future mobility framework' is due to be negotiated as 
part of a future relationship agreement.  
This article addresses citizens' rights both under the November 2018 
Withdrawal Agreement (Section II) and, more speculatively, under a future 
mobility framework (Section III). The implications of a no-deal Brexit for 
citizens' rights will also be discussed. Finally, Section IV will look into 
international mobility rights, specifically the default position as provided by 
the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) provisions of the 
World Trade Organization (WTO). It will be argued that while the rights of 
EU citizens already in the UK (and vice versa) are fairly generously protected 
under the WA, a no-deal Brexit threatens that security, particularly for UK 
nationals in the EU. It will also be argued that even with a future trade 
agreement, the future mobility framework will, intentionally, be far removed 
from any notion of free movement as it is currently understood. In the event 
of a no-deal Brexit, reliance on GATS as the vehicle for future mobility for 
UK nationals into the EU for work purposes will be very limiting and will 
necessitate a very different approach to migration from the current one.   
We begin by looking at mobility rights under the Withdrawal Agreement 
(WA), noting that at the time of writing the WA has not passed through the 
 
3 Section II of this article will nevertheless address the future mobility framework 
envisioned by UK policy makers. 
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UK parliament, despite three attempts.4 The third meaningful vote, which 
took place in the House of Commons on 23 March 2019, resulted in a 
rejection of the UK Government's motion to approve the WA by 344 votes 
to 286 and led to the extension of the Article 50 negotiating period until 31 
October 2019. If the UK Parliament fails to approve the WA (or a 
renegotiated version of the WA), the Article 50 process will result in a no-
deal Brexit. The discussion below reflects the content of the WA, bearing in 
mind that at present the WA is not a binding commitment in the form of an 
international treaty. 
II. CITIZENS' RIGHTS UNDER THE WITHDRAWAL AGREEMENT 
In its 29 April 2017 Guidelines, the European Council said: 
Agreeing reciprocal guarantees to safeguard the status and rights derived 
from EU law at the date of withdrawal of EU and UK citizens, and their 
families, affected by the United Kingdom's withdrawal from the Union will 
be the first priority for the negotiations.5 
Citizens' rights were the subject of an early agreement in principle between 
the parties during Phase I of the negotiations under Article 50 TEU, the 
results of which were first laid out in the 8 December 2017 Joint Report6 and 
then translated into a legal text, the Withdrawal Agreement. The agreement 
on citizens' rights can be found in Part II of the WA.  
The governing principle of the Joint Report and the WA is the reciprocal 
protection of residence rights for those citizens of the EU Member States in 
 
4 'Agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland from the European Union and the European Atomic Energy 
Community', as agreed at negotiators' level on 25 November 2018 
<https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/draft_withdrawal_ 
agreement_0.pdf> accessed 30 August 2019.The UK Parliament has rejected the 
agreement on three occasions, and it is therefore unclear whether it will be 
adopted. 
5 European Council Guidelines (n 2), para 8, p 5. 
6 'Joint Report from the Negotiators of the European Union and the United 
Kingdom Government on Progress during the Phase 1 of Negotiations under 
Article 50 TEU on the United Kingdom's Orderly Withdrawal from the European 
Union of 8 December 2017', European Commission <https://ec.europa.eu/ 
commission/sites/beta-political/files/joint_report.pdf> accessed 30 August 2019. 
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the UK and UK citizens in the EU who have exercised free movement rights 
by the specified exit date. This section addresses whose rights are protected 
(subsection 1), the content of citizens' rights (subsection 2), and the relevant 
institutional framework (subsection 3). Subsection 4 concludes with a brief 
discussion of what might happen in the event of a no-deal Brexit. 
1. The Scope of Application of Citizens' Rights 
The UK and the EU have agreed to preserve residence rights acquired before 
the UK's withdrawal from the Union. Citizens who, in accordance with 
Union law, legally reside in the UK, and UK nationals who, in accordance 
with Union law, legally reside in one of the EU27 Member States, as well as 
their family members, fall within the scope of protection. The UK 
Government's White Paper on immigration7 indicates that during the 
transition period, the Government will implement the EU Settlement 
Scheme. This scheme is in fact already being rolled out.8 The aim of the 
scheme is to ensure a post-Brexit continuation of the residence rights of EU 
citizens already resident in the UK and of those who arrive in the UK during 
the transition period. Similar arrangements will be negotiated with EFTA 
states (Norway, Iceland, Liechtenstein and Switzerland). 
As of March 2019,9 the UK has opened up the EU Settlement Scheme10 not 
just for EU nationals but also for EEA nationals and Swiss citizens, who must 
 
7 'The UK's Future Skills-based Immigration System' (December 2018), Cm 9722 
<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/att
achment_data/file/766672/The-UKs-future-skills-based-immigration-system-
accessible-version.pdf> accessed 30 August 2019. 
8 'A Call to Apply for the EU Settlement Scheme' <https://www.gov.uk/settled-
status-eu-citizens-families> accessed 30 August 2019.  
9 Prior to that there had been testing of the scheme on certain employers in certain 
geographic areas: <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/ 
system/uploads/attachment_data/file/752872/181031_PB1_Report_Final.pdf> 
accessed 30 August 2019. On the roll out, see https://www.parliament. 
uk/business/publications/written-questions-answers-statements/written-
statement/Commons/2018-12-20/HCWS1226/> accessed 30 August 2019. 
10 See the Statement of Intent <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/ 
uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/718237/EU_Settlement_Scheme_S
OI_June_2018.pdf> accessed 30 August 209 and then the changes to the 
immigration rules: <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/ 
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apply by 30 June 2021 if they wish to continue living in the UK after that date 
(those who have Irish nationality or have indefinite leave to remain do not 
need to apply). The scheme will be open until six months after the end of 
transition period. The EU Settlement Scheme is in line with the WA which 
states that Union citizens and UK nationals, and their respective family 
members, who have resided legally in the host State in accordance with Union 
law for a continuous period of five years or for the period specified in Article 
17 of Directive 2004/38/EC,11 shall have the right to reside permanently in the 
host State.12 It is important to emphasise that the scheme is subject to the 
conclusion of the WA with the EU which would provide for a transition 
period. A policy paper published by the UK Government, however, says that 
the UK will continue to run the EU Settlement Scheme for those residing in 
the UK by exit day in a 'no-deal' scenario.13 
While the Joint Report does not specify the end date for acquiring residence 
rights, the WA sets out a transition period14 during which free movement 
applies.15 If concluded by both parties, the WA may extend free movement 




> accessed 30 August 2019. The website is: <https://www.gov.uk/settled-status-eu-
citizens-families/applying-for-settled-status>. 
11 Art 17 of the Directive 2004/38/EC lists cases when the right of permanent 
residence in the host Member State may be enjoyed before completion of a 
continuous period of five years of residence (e.g. incapacity to work, retirement and 
other). 
12 Art 15(1) of the Agreement on the Withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland from the European Union and the European Atomic 
Energy Community, as agreed at negotiators' level on 25 November 2018 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/withdrawal-agreement-and-
political-declaration> accessed 30 August 2019. 
13 'Citizens' Rights – EU citizens in the UK and UK nationals in the EU', 
Department for Exiting the European Union <https://assets.publishing.service. 
gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/790570/Policy_
Paper_on_citizens_rights_in_the_event_of_a_no_deal_Brexit.pdf> accessed 30 
August 2019. 
14 See Armstrong in this issue. 
15 For details: Immigration (European Economic Area) Regulations 2016 
<http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2016/1052/made> accessed 30 August 2019. 
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2022.16 In such a case, residence rights of citizens who moved before that 
point,17 and family members,18 as well as those whose entry was facilitated19 
would retain such rights after the transition period. Those who, on the 
specified date, are working as frontier workers also fall within the scope of 
protection.20 
Those protected as family members must already be resident or already be a 
family member or have been born or adopted by someone already qualifying 
as a family member.21 EU and UK citizens and their family members will 
retain their residence rights as provided for under the EU treaties and the 
Citizens' Rights Directive 2004/38.22 Under the WA, those with permanent 
residence will acquire 'settled status' under the same rules as those under 
Directive 2004/38/EC.23 That status can be lost after five years' departure (as 
compared with two years under the Directive 2004/38/EC).24 Those without 
five years of residence will enjoy 'accumulation of periods' under Article 16 of 
the WA which essentially means that these individuals will acquire 'pre-
settled status' prior to acquiring settled status. In that period prior to five 
years, individuals can change their status, for example, from being a worker 
to a student.25  
In addition to family members who are already resident, the WA also 
discusses the rights of certain categories of family members, irrespective of 
their nationality, who were not residing in the EU/UK before the specified 
date (i.e. the end of the transition period under the WA, if adopted) to join a 
 
16 Art 132(2) of the WA. 
17 Art 10(1)(a)-(d) of the WA. 
18 Art 10(1)(e)-(f) of the WA. 
19 Art 10(2)-(3) of the WA, which refer to Art 3(2) of Directive 2004/38/EC. 
Facilitation concerns those family members who do not have a right of entry and 
residence but who fall under the discretionary list of those whose entry the host 
Member State should facilitate. 
20 Art 10(1)(c) of the WA, para 15, p 2 of the Joint Report. 
21 Art 10(1)(e) of the WA. 
22 Art 13 of the WA. 
23 Art 15(1) and (2) of the WA. 
24 Art 15(3) of the WA. 
25 Art 17 of the WA. 
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Union citizen or UK national.26 Such family members may include family 
members as referred to in Article 2 of the Directive 2004/38/EC27 and 
children born or legally adopted. 
The acquisition of residence rights and of the right of permanent residence 
before the end of the transition period (again, only if the EU and the UK 
conclude the WA which provides for a transition period) is subject to 
conditions under EU law. The Joint Report states that the conditions for 
acquiring the right of residence under the WA are those set out in Articles 6 
and 7 of Directive 2004/38/EC. The Directive distinguishes different 
conditions depending on whether the length of stay is three months (Article 
6) or longer (Article 7). EU and UK nationals, and their family members, will 
continue to have the reciprocal right of residence for a period of up to three 
months without any conditions or any formalities other than the 
requirement to hold a valid identity card or passport. A stay exceeding three 
months is limited to: 
 workers or the self-employed (Article 7(1)(a)) 
 those with sufficient resources for themselves and their family 
members not to become a burden on the social assistance system of 
the host State (Article 7(1)(b)) 
 those enrolled at a private or public establishment for the principle 
purpose of study or have comprehensive sickness insurance cover in 
the host State (Article 7(1)(c)) 
 family members joining a Union citizen who falls under one of above 
categories (Article 7(1)(d)) 
As for the acquisition of the right of permanent residence, the conditions 
listed in the Directive 2004/38/EC apply. Article 16 states the general rule 
which requires residence for a continuous period of five years. Continuity of 
residence shall not be affected by temporary absences not exceeding a total 
 
26 Art 9(a) of the WA, para 12, p 2 of the Joint Report. 
27 Under Art 2 of the Directive 2004/38/EC family members include: the spouse, a 
registered partner, the direct descendants who are under the age of 21 or are 
dependants and those of the spouse or partner, the dependent direct relatives in 
the ascending line and those of the spouse or partner. 
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of six months in a given year. Article 17 lists exemptions from this general rule 
for people who may acquire permanent residence rights before completion 
of a continuous period of five years of residence. Such people include, for 
example, workers or the self-employed who at the time they stop working 
become entitled to an old-age pension.28 
According to the Joint Report, the EU and the UK can require persons 
concerned to apply to obtain a residence status and be issued with a residence 
document attesting to the existence of that right.29 The WA contains a lot of 
detail on the practicalities of attaining these new statuses. It requires that the 
relevant administrative procedures be 'smooth, transparent and simple' and 
that unnecessary administrative burdens be avoided.30 Application forms 
must be short, simple, and user-friendly; applications by families must be 
considered together.31 Applications must be free of charge or for a fee not 
exceeding that imposed on nationals.32 Those already with the right of 
permanent residence can simply swap the documentation subject to 
criminality and ID check.33 What is different about the new procedures is 
that criminality and security checks are carried out systematically.34 There 
must, however, be judicial and administrative redress for those affected by 
the State's decisions.35 Protection is for life,36 unless the individual leaves the 
country for five years. 
It can thus be concluded that the scope of application of citizens' rights as 
negotiated during Phase I is limited and only partially reflects the extent of 
 
28 Art 17(1)(a) of the Directive 2004/38/EC. 
29 Para 16, p 3 of the Joint Report. 
30 Art 18(1)(e) of the WA, para 17, p 3 of the Joint Report. See also a technical note 
prepared by the UK Government which sets out proposed procedures under its 
national law, which it will continue to develop over the coming months: 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/citizens-rights-administrative-
procedures-in-the-uk> accessed 30 August 2019. 
31 Art 18(1)(f) of the WA, para 17(c) of the Joint Report. 
32 Art 18(1)(g) of the WA, para 17(e) of the Joint Report (the UK has in act waived the 
fee). 
33 Art 18(1)(i) of the WA. 
34 Art 18(1)(p) of the WA, para 24 of the Joint Report. 
35 Art 18(1)(r) of the WA, para 18 of the Joint Report. 
36 Art 39 of the WA. 
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free movement rights under EU law. The latter applies to all EU citizens who 
have already moved or will move to another Member State in the future, 
whereas citizens' rights under the WA are applicable only to those who 
exercise(d) their free movement rights within a limited period of time. In 
effect, only Britons who move(d) to one of the EU Member States and EU 
citizens who move(d) to the UK before the end of transition/withdrawal date 
will enjoy rights currently offered under EU law. Such rights will not be 
offered to those who move post-exit/transition date. This 'beat the clock' 
policy did not result in increased migration flows to the UK. On the contrary, 
EU net migration has fallen sharply since the Brexit referendum to a level last 
seen in 2013.37 Future uncertainty about immigration status may well be one 
cause of this.38 Neither does the number of those who have applied to the EU 
Settlement Scheme indicate a great hurry to ensure their right to remain in 
the UK post-Brexit, with only approximately 30 per cent of EU/EEA and 
Swiss nationals (excluding Irish nationals) living in the UK having registered 
under the Scheme so far.39 The number of applications to the EU Settlement 
Scheme is, however, gradually increasing, possibly as a result of the Brexit 
deadline.40 
2. The Content of Citizens' Rights 
During Phase I of negotiations, the EU and the UK agreed to commit to the 
principle of non-discrimination with respect to the treatment of citizens, the 
cornerstone principle of the free movement framework under EU law. The 
 
37 'Migration Statistics Quarterly Report: February 2019', Office for National 
Statistics <https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/population 
andmigration/internationalmigration/bulletins/migrationstatisticsquarterlyreport
/february2019> accessed 30 August 2019. 
38 Jonathan Portes, 'When It Comes to Immigration, the UK is Already in a Post-
Brexit Era' (UK and EU, 30 May 2019) <https://ukandeu.ac.uk/when-it-comes-to-
immigration-the-uk-is-already-in-a-post-brexit-era/> accessed 30 August 2019. 
39 'The Progress of the EU Settlement Scheme So Far', the House of Commons 
Library <https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/home-affairs/immigration/the-
progress-of-the-eu-settlement-scheme-so-far/> accessed 30 August 2019. The 
source indicates that the data is based on the number of EU, EEA or Swiss nationals 
living in the UK (3.35 million), estimated using surveys since there is no centralized 
record of the number of EU citizens living in the UK. 
40 Ibid. 
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principle of non-discrimination and full reciprocity with respect to the future 
mobility framework has also been set out in paragraph 51 of the non-binding 
Political Declaration annexed to the WA, which is discussed in Section III 
below. 
The WA says that any discrimination on grounds of nationality will be 
prohibited in the host State and the State of work in respect of Union citizens 
and UK nationals, as well as their respective family members covered by the 
agreement.41 Family members will continue to have access to employment;42 
equal treatment continues to apply for EU/UK nationals and their family 
members.43 The differences apply in respect of criminal matters. Criminal 
behaviour will be assessed by EU standards if it occurs before the end of the 
transition period,44 but by (stricter) national standards afterwards.45 
However, the rights of appeal in EU legislation will still apply.46 Recognition 
of qualifications will also continue.47 
The EU and the UK have agreed that social security coordination rules will 
apply.48 Those citizens covered by the social coordination scheme will 
continue to be eligible for healthcare reimbursement, including under the 
European Health Insurance Card (EHIC) scheme,49 as long as they stay, 
reside or continue treatment in the host State. While access to social security 
for Union citizens was one of the key points of contention during the debates 
leading up to the 2016 referendum, the right to equal treatment with respect 
to social security for those citizens who have acquired residence rights before 
the end of transition period (or the date of withdrawal in case of a no-deal 
Brexit) will continue to apply within the limits established under EU law.50 
 
41 Art 12 of the WA. 
42 Art 22 of the WA. 
43 Art 23 of the WA. 
44 Art 20(1) of the WA. 
45 Art 20(2) of the WA 
46 Art 21 of the WA. 
47 Arts 27-9 of the WA. 
48 Art 31 of the WA, para 28, p 4 of the Joint Report. Social security coordination rules 
set out in Regulations (EC) No 883/2004 and (EC) No 987/2009 will apply. 
49 The European Health Insurance Card scheme will be governed by the Regulation 
(EC) No 883/2004. 
50 Art 23 of the WA, para 31, p 5 of the Joint Report. 
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It is important to re-emphasise that while key principles of EU law, such as 
equal treatment, have been reaffirmed by the parties during Phase I of 
negotiations, they will apply only to a small group of people, namely those 
citizens who move to the EU/UK before the end of transition 
period/withdrawal. In effect, the parties have agreed on an exceptional 
extension of personal and territorial scope of EU citizenship to a limited 
category of people: British nationals who move to the EU before the end of 
the transition period will continue to enjoy some of the significant rights 
under EU law while no longer being citizens of the EU; EU nationals who 
move to the UK will enjoy those rights in the territory of a state which is no 
longer a member of the EU.  
3. The Institutional Framework 
The WA provides for a dual institutional framework for the implementation 
and application of the citizens' rights. The European Commission will be a 
designated institution on the Union's side, whereas the UK will have to set 
up an Independent Authority – with similar powers to those of the European 
Commission – to assist EU27 citizens in the UK.51 The latter will have the 
power to conduct enquiries on its own initiative concerning breaches of 
citizens' rights by the administrative authorities of UK. It will also receive 
complaints from EU citizens as to how they are treated. The European 
Commission will be able to submit observations in UK cases.52 The scope and 
functions of the Independent Authority, including its role in acting on 
citizens' complaints, will be discussed between the parties in the next phase 
of the negotiations and reflected in the WA. There should be regular 
exchange of information between the UK Government and the Commission. 
The role of the Court of Justice of the EU ('the Court'), a highly contentious 
issue during the 2016 referendum debates, was also addressed during Phase I 
of the negotiations. The Court, which is the ultimate authority for the 
interpretation of Union law, will retain its interpretative authority in the 
context of the application or interpretation of citizens' rights.53 Accordingly, 
 
51 Art 159 of the WA, para 40, p 6 of the Joint Report. 
52 Art 162 of the WA. 
53 Para 38, p 6 of the Joint Report. 
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the UK courts will have due regard to relevant decisions of the Court.54 UK 
courts and tribunals can (but are under no obligation to) refer cases to the 
Court; the Court's rulings will have the same effects as a preliminary 
reference under Article 267 TFEU in national law.55 This mechanism should 
be available for litigation brought within eight years from the date of 
application of the citizens' rights.56 
4. Implications of a No-Deal Brexit 
Protection of citizens' rights as negotiated during Phase I is subject to the 
conclusion of a WA.57 At the time of writing the WA has not been approved 
by the UK parliament (in the form of the Withdrawal and Implementation 
Bill) nor has it been approved by the European Parliament. This suggests that 
the UK is heading towards a no-deal Brexit, albeit subject to the delay 
envisaged by the Hillary Benn Act, the EU (Withdrawal) (No.6) Act, which 
entails that there should be no no-deal Brexit until the end of January 2020 
unless Parliament says otherwise. A no-deal Brexit would mean a separation 
without any agreed arrangements between the UK and the EU. Without a 
binding agreement, Part II of the WA cannot be enforced by the parties. In 
the event of a no-deal Brexit, the UK Government has committed itself to 
continue running the EU Settlement Scheme for those EU nationals resident 
in the UK by exit day.58 The basis for qualifying for status under the scheme 
will remain the same as proposed in a 'deal' scenario and will be focused on 
residence in the UK. This means that any EU citizen living in the UK by exit 
day will be eligible to apply to this scheme, securing their status under UK 
law. Those resident on exit day will have until 31 December 2020 to apply for 
the settled status under the scheme. Until then, EU citizens will continue to 
be able to rely on their passport (as a British citizen may) or national identity 
 
54 Art 4(5) of the WA. 
55 Art 158(2) of the WA. 
56 Art 158(1) of the WA. 
57 Para 5, p 1 of the Joint Report. 
58 'Citizens' Rights - EU citizens in the UK and UK nationals in the EU', Department 
for Exiting the European Union <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/ 
government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/790570/Policy_Paper_
on_citizens_rights_in_the_event_of_a_no_deal_Brexit.pdf> accessed 30 August 
2019. 
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card if they are asked to provide evidence of their right to reside in the UK 
when, for example, applying for a job.  
However, as the UK points out,59 in a 'no-deal' scenario there will be some 
significant differences as compared to the position under the WA. Firstly, as 
there would be no agreed transition period, the settled status guarantee 
would apply only to EU citizens who are resident in the UK by exit day. 
Second, judicial remedies before the EU Courts will no longer be available. 
Due to the unilateral nature of the protection of citizens' rights, EU citizens 
would have the right to challenge a refusal of UK immigration status under 
the EU Settlement Scheme only by way of administrative review and judicial 
review under UK law; there would be no preliminary reference procedure to 
the Court of Justice of the EU. The EU deportation threshold would 
continue to apply to crimes committed before the exit day. However, the UK 
would apply the UK deportation threshold to crimes committed after that 
date. 
For UK nationals living in the EU, the position is much less clear. Some may 
be able to acquire the nationality of the host State under national law and 
thereby retain the right to reside. Others may benefit from the Long-term 
Residents Directive 2003/10960 which contains some protection for third-
country nationals including limited onward free movement rights. Those not 
covered will be dependent on any bilateral arrangements concluded between 
the UK and the EU Member States.61 A number of Member States have, 
however, put in place some contingency arrangements.62 
As for those EU nationals wishing to come to the UK after exit day, in the 
event of a no deal, the position is more complicated. When Boris Johnson 
became Prime Minister, his new Home Secretary, Priti Patel, announced that 
 
59 Ibid. 
60 [2003] OJ L16/44. See further Catherine Barnard, The Substantive Law of the EU: 
The Four Freedoms (6th edn, Oxford University Press 2019), ch 10. 
61 For example, see for Spain: <https://www.lamoncloa.gob.es/lang/en/brexit/ 
howtoprepare/Paginas/190109socialsecurity.aspx>. There is also draft UK 
legislation: The Healthcare (International Arrangements) Bill 2017.  
62 https://ec.europa.eu/info/brexit/brexit-preparedness/citizens-rights_en#spain. 
 
2019} Brexit and Citizens' Rights 131 
 
 
free movement would end immediately on exit day.63 Legally, this would be 
true because, under the operation of Article 50 TEU, the EU Treaties would 
cease to apply to the UK. However, there are no mechanisms to distinguish 
between EU nationals already resident in the UK on exit day, but who have 
not yet acquired settled status, and those arriving after exit day. This problem 
had already been recognised by Patel's predecessor, Sajid Javid, who had 
outlined the following unilateral no-deal arrangements: 
If Britain leaves the EU without agreeing a deal, the Government will seek 
to end free movement as soon as possible and has introduced an Immigration 
Bill to achieve this. For a transitional period only, EEA citizens and their 
family members, including Swiss citizens, will still be able to come to the UK 
for visits, work or study and they will be able to enter the UK as they do now. 
However, to stay longer than 3 months they will need to apply for permission 
and receive European Temporary Leave to Remain [Euro TLR], which is 
valid for a further 3 years.64 
Patel was eventually persuaded that her predecessor's plans made sense and 
she changed her position.65 Successful applicants to the Euro TLR scheme 
will be granted a period of 36 months' leave to remain in the UK, running 
from the date the leave is granted. They will then have to apply under the new 
points-based immigration system, due to be introduced from January 2021, to 
secure their status.66 The following section addresses this new scheme in 
more detail. 
In conclusion, with or without a withdrawal agreement, free movement of 
persons will end once the UK leaves the EU. Even if the parties conclude the 






64 Press release on 28 January 2019 <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/ 
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residence and access to social security, will apply only to a small portion of 
the population, that is, only those who have/will acquire their rights before 
the end of the transition period. A no-deal scenario will bring an end to free 
movement, leaving many people, including UK nationals in the EU, without 
the security they have enjoyed for almost five decades. 
III. THE FUTURE MOBILITY FRAMEWORK 
Unlike the citizens' rights provisions which were negotiated during Phase I 
for EU citizens living in the UK and UK citizens in the EU, the future 
mobility regime will be negotiated as part of the framework for the future 
relationship between the UK and the EU. The agreement for the future 
relationship falls outside the scope of the WA under Article 50 TEU. The 
WA must only 'take account' of the framework for the future relationship.67 
The non-binding Political Declaration68 on the future relationship annexed 
to the WA provides brief indicators of the future mobility framework. Its 
content reflects the UK's decision to end free movement of persons between 
the Union and the UK.69 The document calls for visa-free travel for short-
term visits.70 It also states that the parties agree to consider conditions for 
entry and stay for purposes such as research, study, training and youth 
exchanges, in addition to temporary stays for business purposes.71 The parties 
further agree to consider addressing social security coordination in the light 
of future movement of persons.72 
On the UK side, the Government published its vision of its future 
immigration regime, not just for EU nationals but those from the rest of the 
world, in the December 2018 White Paper on immigration ('the White 
 
67 Art 50(2) TEU. 
68 'Political Declaration Setting Out the Framework for the Future Relationship 
between the European Union and the United Kingdom', 22 November 2018, XT 
21095/18 <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/37059/20181121-cover-political-
declaration.pdf> accessed 30 August 2019. 
69 Ibid. para 50. 
70 Ibid. para 52. 
71 Ibid. para 53. 
72 Ibid. para 54. 
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Paper').73 The White Paper follows almost all of the recommendations of the 
Migration Advisory Committee's (MAC) 18 September 2018 Report on 
Migration ('MAC Report').74 Both documents largely reflect the UK 
Government's position on future immigration laid out in the so-called 
Chequers Plan published in July 2018.75 
The UK Government's proposals are built on two assumptions. Firstly, the 
White Paper is based on the premise that UK immigration policy is not 
included in an agreement on the future EU-UK relationship. The central 
principle of immigration policy proposed in the White Paper is to grant EU 
citizens no more favourable treatment than citizens from non-EU States. 
However, while the UK, upon its withdrawal from the EU, will be able to 
decide unilaterally on its immigration policy, its policies will nevertheless be 
subject to the conclusion of negotiations between the EU and the UK on 
their future relationship. The Chequers Plan of July 2018, the first coherent 
attempt by the UK to set out what it wanted out of the future relationship 
between the UK and the EU,76 while otherwise largely in line with the White 
Paper, focuses on the need to obtain reciprocal immigration arrangements 
with the EU and does not mention that EU citizens and non-EU nationals 
will be treated alike. That is, unlike the White Paper, which focuses on the 
single regime for all nationalities, the Chequers Plan is based on a plan to 
agree a new and deep trade deal with the EU without obliging the 
 
73 The UK's future skills-based immigration system, December 2018, Cm 9722 
<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/att
achment_data/file/766672/The-UKs-future-skills-based-immigration-system-
accessible-version.pdf> accessed 30 August 2019. 
74 Migration Advisory Committee, 'EEA Migration in the UK: Final Report' 
<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/att
achment_data/file/741926/Final_EEA_report.PDF> accessed 30 August 2019. 
75 'The Future Relationship between the United Kingdom and the European Union', 
July 2018, Cm 9593 <https://static.rasset.ie/documents/news/2018/07/the-future-
relationship-between-the-united-kingdom-and-the-european-union-web-
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Government to establish a single immigration regime for EU and third-
country nationals. 
Secondly, some elements of the new regime are based on the assumption that 
there will be a transition period.77 Specifically, the White Paper lays out the 
EU Settlement Scheme discussed above, which will be implemented during 
the transition period. According to the White Paper, the new immigration 
system will start to operate from the end of this transition period.78 While in 
case of a no-deal Brexit the UK Government has committed itself to 
continue running the EU Settlement Scheme for those resident in the UK by 
exit day, and the EuroTLR scheme for new arrivals from the EU, EEA and 
Switzerland, it is likely that a points-based, skills-based immigration system 
will be adopted in the event of a no-deal Brexit.79  
Keeping these two assumptions in mind, we now address the content of the 
post-Brexit immigration system as proposed in the White Paper. 
1. The Post-Brexit Immigration System: Introduction 
The cornerstone of the new UK immigration system proposed in the White 
Paper is that, following the transition period (if any), during which the status 
quo will remain, free movement of persons – a fundamental freedom under 
EU law – will end. Following the transition period, non-nationals coming to 
the UK, including EU citizens, who intend to work, study or join family will 
need permission to do so, normally in the form of an electronic status which 
must be obtained before coming to the UK. The same holds true for British 
citizens entering an EU Member State as a non-EU national (though this is 
subject to EU rules).80 These UK reforms will not apply to citizens of the 
Republic of Ireland, who are covered by arrangements made between Ireland 
 
77 See Armstrong in this issue. 
78 The White Paper 9. 
79 <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/home-secretary-tasks-mac-on-
australian-style-points-based-immigration-system>. 
80 Regulation (EU) 2019 /592 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 
April 2019 amending Regulation (EU) 2018/1806 listing the third countries whose 
nationals must be in possession of visas when crossing the external borders and 
those whose nationals are exempt from that requirement, as regards the withdrawal 
of the United Kingdom from the Union. 
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and the UK under the Common Travel Area (CTA) before the UK's 
accession to the EU. 
As we have seen, the essential feature of the immigration policy under the 
White Paper is the replacement of a two-tier immigration system for (i) non-
EU nationals and (ii) EU citizens with a single immigration regime. The 
policy is consistent with the post-2016 referendum pledge, so often expressed 
by the then Prime Minister Theresa May, to introduce a controlled migration 
regime.81 The perception was that the almost unrestricted migration from 
the EU was pushing up numbers of immigrants to the UK to unsustainable 
levels and thereby preventing the UK delivering on the Conservative Party's 
election manifesto pledge of reducing immigration to the tens of thousands.82 
In practice, however, non-EU migration, over which the UK Government 
has always had full control, has been higher than EU migration. Long-term 
EU immigration has fallen since 2016 and is at its lowest since 2013.83 Long-
term non-EU immigration has gradually increased over the last five years to 
similar levels as those seen in 2011.84 As the Office for National Statistics 
points out,  
long-term international net migration data show that migrants continued to 
add to the UK population as an estimated 258,000 more people moved to the 
UK with an intention to stay 12 months or more than left in the year ending 
December 2018. Over the year, 602,000 people moved to the UK 
(immigration) and 343,000 people left the UK (emigration).85 
 
81 For example, in her Lancaster House speech of 17 January 2017, then-Prime 
Minister Theresa May stated 'As Home Secretary for six years, I know that you 
cannot control immigration overall when there is free movement to Britain from 
Europe' (full text of the speech available at: https://static. 
rasset.ie/documents/news/theresa-may-speech.pdf, accessed 30 August 2019). 
82 The Conservative Party, 'The Conservative Manifesto 2017', 54 
<https://www.conservatives.com/manifesto> accessed 30 August 2019. 




decreased> accessed 30 August 2019. 
84 Ibid. 
85 Office of National Statistics, 'Migration Statistics Quarterly Report: May 2019', 
<https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigrati
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The current two-tier system allows only highly skilled workers from outside 
the EU to be admitted to the UK, while workers of all skill levels can be 
admitted from the EU. This regime will be replaced with a single route which 
gives access to highly skilled workers from all countries. Those EU citizens 
arriving in the UK after the new UK regime has been introduced will be 
subject to the single immigration policy applicable to persons of all 
nationalities. Highly skilled workers will be allowed to bring dependents, to 
extend their stay and switch to other immigration routes (e.g. specialist route, 
such as scientific researchers), and, in some cases, to settle permanently. The 
proposed scheme establishes different regimes for (i) visitors, (ii) workers, 
and (iii) others (students, self-employed, pensioners). 
2. Visitors 
There will be no visa requirement for EU citizens coming to the UK as 
visitors.86 This includes, for example, tourists and those coming to see their 
friends and family. The White Paper anticipates a reciprocal arrangement 
from the EU. The proposals concerning visitors laid out in the White Paper 
therefore reflect the guidelines suggested in the July 2018 Chequers Plan, 
which calls for a reciprocal visa-free regime for short-term visitors. Most 
visitors will be able to stay in the UK for up to six months. Visitors may not 
study for more than 30 days, work or access public funds.  
The visitors category also covers short-term business activity, such as coming 
to the UK for meetings to negotiate and sign business contracts, presentation 
of research, collaboration, collaboration with UK colleagues on specific 
projects, working with companies who have bought goods from a foreign 
manufacturer or where a UK company is supplying a company overseas, 
coming to UK to investigate and secure funding, etc. Save for some 
exceptions, paid activity is not generally permitted.  
 
on/internationalmigration/bulletins/migrationstatisticsquarterlyreport/may2019> 
accessed 30 August 2019. 
86 The White Paper, para 11, p 12. 
 




Those seeking to stay permanently in the UK to work will be required to get 
prior permission. The White Paper envisages two new work routes: 
1. One for skilled workers entitled to stay for longer periods, to bring 
dependents and in some cases to settle permanently, who will mainly87 need 
to be sponsored by an employer – this will be open to migrants of all 
nationalities. 
2. Another for temporary short-term workers at all skill levels, not sponsored, 
but subject to strictly defined conditions. This will be a transitional route and 
will only be open to migrants from specified low-risk countries. 
A. Skilled workers 
Currently, skilled workers mainly come to the UK on a Tier 2 visa. This is a 
bureaucratic and expensive process.88 As it currently stands, organisations 
wishing to employ non-EEA nationals must hold a Tier 2 sponsor licence. 
The application fee for the licence varies depending on whether an 
organisation is considered to be a small company (£536) or a medium/large 
company (£1,476). Once an organisation has a sponsor licence, it will then 
need to issue a Certificate of Sponsorship to any individuals who are to be 
sponsored, the cost of which is £199. In addition, in 2017, the Immigration 
Skills Charge was introduced. The charge (£1,000 per year in the case of large 
companies and £364 per year for small companies) applies in the majority of 
other circumstances.89 In addition, there is a health surcharge (£400 per 
person per year90) as well as the visa charge itself (£1220 per person). 
 
87 There will be some exceptions from the requirement for skilled workers to be 
sponsored by their employer, such as in relation to innovative industries. For 
example, supernumerary researchers who come to the UK under the skilled work 
route may be supported by Awards and Fellowships and members of established 
research teams may be sponsored by UK Higher Education Institutions and the 
Research Councils, see the White Paper, para 6.7, p 45. 
88 See further Kern Alexander, Catherine Barnard, Eilís Ferran, Andrew Lang and 
Niamh Moloney, Brexit and Financial Services (Hart Publishing 2018) ch 2. 
89 The charge is not payable in relation to those who are switching from the Tier 4 to 
Tier 2 category. 
90 <https://www.gov.uk/healthcare-immigration-application/how-much-pay>. 
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Employers must also satisfy the 'resident labour market test' (RLMT), 
advertising the job for 28 days and considering applications from resident 
workers before offering it to a non-resident person. The individual must also 
have the requisite level of skill and pay (see below).91 These financial and 
procedural burdens may provide a disincentive to organisations to employ 
foreign workers. Once a single immigration regime is introduced, EEA 
nationals will be subject to the same Tier 2 visa requirements as non-EEA 
nationals. However, the White Paper proposes eliminating a number of 
significant restrictions currently in place. 
Firstly, the White Paper suggests a significant change as to the volume of 
immigration: the current cap of 20,700 places a year for skilled workers is to 
be eliminated and a no-limit system is to be introduced. Secondly, the White 
Paper considers abolishing the resident labour market test (RLMT) to reduce 
the administrative burdens on employers currently using the non-EEA 
system. The document implies that the RLMT does not offer effective 
protection against employers seeking migrant labour when domestic 
alternatives are available.92 Instead, according to the Migration Advisory 
Committee (MAC), the best way to protect against employers under-cutting 
UK-born workers is a 'robust approach to salary thresholds and the 
Immigration Skills Charge'.93 Thirdly, the White Paper suggests lowering the 
points-based skills threshold to cover current workers with intermediate 
skills. Under the current system, non-EU workers with intermediate skills are 
unable to come to UK on the high-skilled route (Tier 2), which is limited to 
occupations at Regulated Qualification Framework (RQF) 6 and above (i.e. 
graduate and postgraduate level jobs). The White Paper proposes to open the 
skilled workers route to workers from RQF 3 upwards. In its report, MAC 
recommended maintaining the minimum salary threshold of £30,000 for 
those with intermediate skills if the skilled route is expanded to include 




92 The White Paper, 143. 
93 MAC Report, para 7.34. 
94 'Sajid Javid orders review into £30,000 salary threshold for immigrants post-Brexit' 
(PoliticsHome, 24 June 2019) <https://www.politicshome.com/news/uk/politics/ 
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£30,000 minimum salary requirement is currently met by 40 per cent of 
existing jobs in the UK. How this number would correlate with post-Brexit 
statistics is yet to be seen. The White Paper leaves the question of the salary 
threshold open. 
Skilled workers will have a range of entitlements (e.g. to bring their 
dependants). They will be allowed to settle in the UK after a period of five 
years. 
B. Workers at All Skills Levels 
The White Paper does not suggest opening an immigration route for 
unskilled labour, thus maintaining the current policy for non-EU citizens, 
except possibly for seasonal agricultural workers. There will be no general use 
of schemes tailored to particular industries. There will, however, be flexibility 
for short-term workers. 
The White Paper suggests that during the transitional period, there should 
be a new route for temporary short-term workers from specified countries 
(e.g. low-risk countries)95 at any skill level to come to work in the UK. This 
route will be narrow: it will not only be subject to visa requirements, but there 
will also be restrictions on nationalities (e.g. only nationals of low risk 
countries with which the UK negotiates migration commitments and 
mobility proposals) and duration.96 The temporal scope will also be limited 
to a maximum of twelve months, to be followed by a cooling-off period of a 
further twelve months to prevent long-term working. This means that a 
short-term worker who has worked in the UK for 12 months will not be able 
to return to work during the following 12 months. The possible need to 
extend a route for temporary workers post-transition period will be 
considered by 2025.97 
 
news/104817/sajid-javid-orders-review-%C2%A330000-salary-threshold-
immigrants-post> accessed 30 August 2019. 
95 The White Paper does not indicate whether EU Member States will fall under the 
category of low-risk countries. The current list of low-risk countries is available 
here: <https://www.gov.uk/guidance/immigration-rules/immigration-rules-appen 
dix-h-tier-4-documentary-requirements> accessed 30 August 2019. 
96 The White Paper, paras 26-32, pp 16-17. 
97 Ibid. para 31, p 17. 
 




The new immigration regime will not affect the number of EU students 
coming to study in the UK. As per the current situation, the White paper 
foresees no limit on the number of international students coming to study in 
the UK. However, EU students will be subject to the same arrangements as 
students from the rest of the world, including the requirement to be 
sponsored by the institution at which they are studying.98 Upon graduating 
with an undergraduate degree from a UK university, students will be able to 
remain in the UK for six months after completing their studies.99 
The White Paper states that self-employed persons coming from EEA 
countries may be able to come to the UK through a variety of routes such as 
the entrepreneur route (if they meet the eligibility criteria, including a 
requirement to have access to at least £50,000 in investment funds).100 In 
addition, the self-employed may be able to use the new skilled worker route, 
under temporary work routes, or enter as service suppliers through Mode 4 
arrangements (see below). 
The White Paper notes that 'leaving the EU means that for the first time in 
generations we can take control of the social security system we apply to EU 
citizens'.101 Under the new regime, social benefits will only be available once 
a person has made significant contributions to the UK economy. 
Accordingly, only EU pensioners with settled status or pre-settled status will 
be able to access healthcare, pensions, and other benefits and services in the 
UK. Depending on reciprocal agreement with the EU, pensioners should 
retain the option to export their state pension.102 
For those seeking controls on migration, the new immigration regime is 
clearly beneficial; for those who lament the demise of free movement, the 
new regime will disappoint. It seems the latter group is growing. While the 
government's policy is responding to the concerns raised in 2016, the state of 
affairs is starting to change: EU immigration numbers continue to fall and 
 
98 Ibid. para 7.7, p 63. 
99 Ibid. para 7.13, p 64. 
100 Ibid. 148. 
101 Ibid. para 14.7, p 96. 
102 Ibid. para 14.8, p 96. 
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public attitudes towards migration are not the same as they were at the time 
of the referendum. An Ipsos Mori online survey has revealed a positive shift 
in the attitudes to immigration in the years following the Brexit referendum. 
In 2015, around 35 per cent of Britons saw immigration as positive; that 
number has risen to 45 per cent since 2016.103 The trend is reversed with 
respect to those who see immigration as negative for UK: around 41 per cent 
in 2015 and 31 per cent in 2018.104 Immigration is, of course, different from 
free movement. Nevertheless, while the majority of Britons are still in favour 
of reduced migration105, there is now more recognition of how much 
immigrants contribute to the UK, with 51 per cent noting that the discussions 
over the past few years have highlighted this point.106 Another recent study 
found that there is a generational difference in the shift of attitudes towards 
migration between 2002 and 2017.107 According to this study, those born 
between approximately 1920 and 1960 are among the most negative about 
immigration, whereas there is a small but significant shift towards more 
positive attitudes among the younger generations. 
In summary, the framework for the new immigration system laid out in the 
government's White Paper has nothing in common with free movement 
enjoyed under EU law. Instead of allowing unrestricted immigration from 
the EU, the new regime places EU nationals in the general customs queue 
with travellers from other third countries. While the discussed regime was 
published under Theresa May's administration, there has so far been no 
indication that the new Prime Minister Boris Johnson would offer EU 
citizens any greater privileges. It is yet to be seen what reciprocal system will 
 
103 Ipsos MORI, 'Attitudes towards immigration: Survey conducted on behalf of 
IMiX' <https://www.ipsos.com/ipsos-mori/en-uk/britons-are-more-positive-
negative-about-immigrations-impact-britain> accessed 1 September 2019. 
104 Ibid. 
105 The Migration Observatory, 'UK Public Opinion toward Immigration: Overall 
Attitudes and Level of Concern' <https://migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/ 
resources/briefings/uk-public-opinion-toward-immigration-overall-attitudes-and-
level-of-concern/> accessed 1 September 2019. 
106 Ibid. 
107 Lauren McLaren, Anja Neundorf and Ian Paterson, 'Diversity and Perceptions of 
Immigration: How the Past Influences the Present' NICEP Working Paper:2019-
01 <https://nicep.nottingham.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/2019-01-
Mclaren-Neundorf-Paterson.pdf> accessed 1 September 2019. 
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be adopted by the EU, but it is highly unlikely that it will offer Britons 
anything close to free movement either.  
IV. INTERNATIONAL MOBILITY 
We have so far focused on the UK's planned immigration regime. However, 
as we have seen, this regime does not take into account what might be agreed 
in a future trade agreement with the EU, which is subject to Phase II of any 
negotiations. While we are still waiting for the second phase of negotiations 
to start, the following section will look at international mobility rules and the 
EU's dealings with third countries in order to explore the possible future EU-
UK arrangement. In this section we look at the international context, namely 
Mode 4 mobility under the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) 
and Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) negotiated by the EU with third 
countries, before addressing UK's Mode 4 access post-Brexit (subsection 1). 
Subsection 2 will briefly address another cornerstone international rule of 
mobility – the most-favoured-nation clause (MFN) – and its implications for 
a future FTA between the UK and the EU. It will be suggested that neither 
Mode 4 mobility nor mobility under the EU's association agreements (AAs) 
is anywhere near the notion of free movement as currently understood. 
1. Mobility under Mode 4 
The basis of any international regime on economic mobility of nationals from 
other countries lies in the GATS under the WTO regime.108 Labour was 
excluded from the WTO framework for a long time. However, during the 
Uruguay Round negotiations in the 1990s, labour was included in the WTO 
regime through GATS commitments. GATS access covers four modes: 
 cross-border supply ('Mode 1'): services supplied from one country to 
another (e.g. GATS Article I:2(a) 
 consumption abroad ('Mode 2'): consumers or firms making use of a 
service in another country such as tourism (GATS Article I:2(b) 
 
108 See Sacerdoti and Mariani in this issue. 
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 commercial presence ('Mode 3'): a foreign company setting up 
subsidiaries or branches to provide services in another country (GATS 
Article I:2(c) 
 presence of natural persons ('Mode 4'): individuals travelling from 
their own country to supply services in another (GATS Article I:2(d) 
The term 'Mode 4' therefore refers to one of the four ways through which 
services can be supplied internationally.109 The fourth mode signifies trade in 
services through presence of natural persons, i.e. natural persons who are 
either service suppliers themselves or who work for a service supplier and 
who travel from one state to another to provide a service. Mode 4 does not 
cover persons seeking access to employment in the host state; it is restricted 
to temporary entry for business purposes. Mode 4 access is of particular 
relevance to this article. What is noteworthy is that it is about temporary 
provision of services only, not permanent immigration which makes it 
essentially different to the free movement regime enjoyed by EU nationals in 
the EU Member States. 
A. Mode 4 Access under GATS 
Calls have been made to expand Mode 4 access under the WTO framework, 
most notably in the Hong Kong Ministerial Conference in December 
2005.110 However, liberalisation under GATS Mode 4 remains rather limited. 
In most cases, Member States of the WTO did not initially bind themselves 
to Mode 4 access and then qualified this general exemption by granting 
admission to selected categories of service providers, primarily persons 
linked to a commercial presence (e.g. intra-corporate transferees) and highly 
skilled persons (managers, executives and specialists). This is often referred 
to as a 'positive listing' method: sectors where access is granted are expressly 
listed and commitments do not apply unless the sector and/or specific sub-
sector is inscribed in the schedule. For example, France, Belgium, the 
Netherlands, Spain and Italy are not committed to GATS Mode 4 for legal 
 
109 Peter van den Bossche, The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization: Text, 
Cases, Materials (2nd edn, Cambridge University Press 2012) 486. 
110 See Annex C to Ministerial Declaration: Annexes, Adopted on 18 December 2005 
<https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min05_e/final_annex_e.htm> 
accessed 30 August 2019. 
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services. Therefore, falling back exclusively on GATS mobility provisions in 
the post-Brexit UK-EU trade relations would pose a significant risk for the 
UK's services sector: on the one hand, this would increase the risk of skilled 
labour shortage in the UK; on the other hand this would limit the scope of 
UK services being exported to the EU. This could have serious consequences 
given that the EU is the single largest destination for UK service providers. 
While trade in services under Mode 4 remains a very small part of overall 
trade in services (around 1-2 per cent)111, the reasons for limited access under 
Mode 4 include political concerns (lack of control over immigration), 
regulatory concerns (how to check on the qualifications and skill levels of 
those proposing to come to the host country), concerns of temporary entry 
leading to permanent entry, and fears that national labour markets might be 
undermined by lower-wage foreign services suppliers (so-called 'social 
dumping').112 
In the absence of any special arrangement, such as a free trade agreement, 
Mode 4 access under GATS, where agreed, is the default position under 
international law and will be the applicable legal regime for UK nationals 
wishing to provide their labour in EU Member States. Due to its temporary 
nature and limited sectoral scope, Mode 4 is far removed from the free 
movement concept. Accordingly, in case of a no-deal Brexit, access to the 
UK/EU would be highly restricted. 
B. Mode 4 Access under Free Trade Agreements 
In addition to the basic WTO framework, somewhat more generous 
temporary movement provisions may be negotiated in broader trade or 
association agreements (AAs). In this section, we look briefly at the mobility 
clauses in a selection of FTAs to see if they provide a template for the future 
EU-UK relationship. Some of the agreements provide for full liberalisation 
of labour mobility, such as the EU, the European Free Trade Association, and 
 
111 World Trade Organization, 'Movement of natural persons' <https:// 
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/mouvement_persons_e/mouvement_perso
ns_e.htm> accessed 6 October 2019. 
112 'Mode 4 of the GATS - An Overview', Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 
<https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/event/sympo0301-6.pdf> accessed 6 
October 2019. 
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the Australia–New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement. 
A number of other trade agreements, while not establishing the full free 
movement of workers, nevertheless go beyond the GATS rules. For example, 
the US–Jordan agreement covers a broadened range of service providers (e.g. 
independent traders).113 Similarly, the EUROMED EU-Tunisia AA covers 
the movement of all workers, not just service suppliers,114 while the ASEAN 
Framework Agreement115 commits members to liberalising trade in services 
by expanding the depth and scope of liberalisation beyond those undertaken 
by Member States under the GATS. A similarly forward-looking approach is 
taken in the CARICOM Revised Treaty, which seeks to achieve full labour 
mobility through phased implementation for different skill categories.116 
Mode 4 access is also typically provided for in the new-generation FTAs. The 
UK, as an EU Member State, is currently bound under the EU's FTAs with 
non-EU countries, such as the Comprehensive Economic and Trade 
Agreement (CETA) between the EU and Canada which entered into force 
provisionally in September 2017.117  
FTAs focus primarily on trade in goods and services as well as investment 
promotion, which is facilitated by some form of movement of persons (e.g. 
service providers and investors travelling for business purposes). The White 
Paper, addressed in the previous section, as well as its predecessor MAC 
 
113 Agreement between the United States of America and the Hashemite Kingdom of 
Jordan on the Establishment of a Free Trade Area <https://ustr. 
gov/sites/default/files/Jordan%20FTA.pdf> accessed 30 August 2019. 
114 Article 64, Euro-Mediterranean Agreement Establishing an Association between 
the European Communities and their Member States, of the One Part, and the 
Republic of Tunisia, of the Other Part <https://library.euneighbours. 
eu/content/eu-tunisia-association-agreement> accessed 30 August 2019. 
115 Article 1(c), ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services <https://asean.org/ 
?static_post=asean-framework-agreement-on-services> accessed 30 August 2019. 
116 Articles 32(1), 33(1), 36(1), 37(1), Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas Establishing the 
Caribbean Community Including the CARICOM Single Market and Economy 
<https://caricom.org/documents/4906-revised_treaty-text.pdf> accessed 30 
August 2019. 
117 The Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between the EU 
and Canada <http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ceta/ceta-article-by-
article/> accessed 30 August 2019. 
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Report, reflect mobility rights typically included under the new-generation 
FTAs, such as CETA. 
Mode 4 access is broader under CETA than under GATS. Unlike GATS, 
which mainly applies a positive listing method for Mode 4 access, CETA 
applies a combination of positive and negative listing. Negative listing means 
that all service sectors are liberalised by default and a party must list any 
sectors or sub-sectors it wishes to limit or exclude from the commitments. 
This results in a broader liberalisation overall, at least de jure, under CETA. 
This does not mean, of course, that CETA provides for access anywhere near 
comparable to free movement provisions under EU law; it contains a number 
of broad explicit carve-outs, such as services supplied in the exercise of 
government authority, most air services, and audio-visual services. 
With respect to the time limits for stay, the principle of a minimal-duration 
stay, according to which workers stay for no longer than the time period 
required to complete a specific engagement, applies. The time periods differ 
depending on the categories of persons described above. For example, under 
CETA intra-corporate transferees (ICT), senior personnel and specialists are 
allowed to stay in the contracting state for up to three years, whereas graduate 
trainees cannot stay longer than one year.  
Other FTAs provide similar mobility rights, save for some variation in the 
categories of covered individuals. For example, under the EU-Japan FTA, 
short-term business visitors, business visitors for establishment purposes (in 
CETA, business visitors for investment purposes), ICTs and investors, as 
well as contractual service suppliers and independent professionals are 
granted entry and temporary stay.118 Similar provisions are provided in the 
EU's association agreements (AA), typically under the heading 'temporary 
presence of natural persons for business purposes'. For example, the EU-
Ukraine AA provides for entry and temporary stay of key personnel, graduate 
trainees, business service sellers, independent professionals, and contractual 
service providers. The agreement states that the parties reaffirm their 
respective obligations arising from their commitments under the GATS as 
 
118 Annex 8-B III, para 6, EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement 
<http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2018/august/tradoc_157233.pdf#page=203> 
accessed 30 August 2019. 
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regards entry and temporary stay of contractual services suppliers.119 Almost 
identical categories are provided in the EU-Moldova AA.120 
The EU-Ukraine AA sets identical time limits for stay to those established 
under CETA, with an exception for the contractual services and independent 
professionals category (CETA permits stays up to 12 months, whereas the 
EU-Ukraine AA sets a six-month limit). 
Mobility under existing FTAs or under EU's association agreements are far 
removed from the concept of free movement offered by EU membership. 
While the scope of Mode 4 is broader under a number of FTAs, in 
comparison to that under GATS, access under FTAs is nevertheless limited 
to mobility of service providers. And while AAs, such as the EU-Ukraine AA, 
typically contain provisions on mobility of workers and movement of 
persons, these too are in no way comparable to free movement of persons 
under EU law. With respect to mobility of workers, the EU-Ukraine AA 
merely upholds existing access to employment for Ukrainian workers 
accorded by EU Member States under bilateral agreements and creates only 
a very general obligation to examine the granting of other more favourable 
provisions in additional areas (Article 18 of the EU-Ukraine AA). Article 15 of 
the EU-Moldova AA provides an analogous obligation to take gradual steps 
towards the shared objective of a visa-free regime in due course. 
As for the application of national immigration laws, the EU's partners under 
AAs retain the right to regulate the entry of natural persons into, or their 
temporary stay in, their respective territories, including those measures 
necessary to protect the integrity of natural persons, to the extent not 
covered by the AAs' rules on temporary stay of persons (e.g. Article 85 of the 
EU-Ukraine AA). The right to maintain national immigration rules is not 
 
119 Article 101, Association Agreement between the European Union and its Member 
States, of the One Part, and Ukraine, of the Other Part 
<http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/november/tradoc_155103.pdf> 
accessed 30 August 2019. 
120 Article 217, Association Agreement between the European Union and the 
European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the One Part, 
and the Republic of Moldova, of the Other Part 
<http://www.3dcftas.eu/system/tdf/EU-Moldova%20AA_0.pdf?file=1&type=node 
&id=70&force=> accessed 30 August 2018. 
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affected by the full liberalisation of establishment rights. The EU-Ukraine 
AA provides that, subject to the gradual transition of Ukraine to full 
regulatory approximation, there are to be no restrictions on the freedom of 
establishment of juridical persons of the EU or Ukraine in either territory, as 
well as no restrictions on the freedom to provide services by a juridical 
person. However, such treatment does not include the right to take up and 
pursue activities as self-employed persons and shall not prevent Ukraine from 
applying measures to regulate the entry of natural persons into, or their 
temporary stay in, its territory, including those measures necessary to protect 
the integrity of, and to ensure the orderly movement of natural persons 
across, its borders (Article 4 of Annex XVII). 
Furthermore, as a general rule, regulatory approximation under the EU AAs 
is directed by the EU: the EU maintains its right to adopt new legislation or 
amend its existing legislation in the sectors concerned by regulatory 
approximation, whereas Ukraine has an obligation to transpose and 
implement the legislation into its domestic legal system (Article 5 of Annex 
XVII). Therefore, the EU's partners under association agreements are rule-
takers, which is hardly in line with the famous Leave Campaign Brexit slogan 
'Take Back Control'. 
In sum, neither Mode 4 access under the currently existing FTAs nor 
mobility under the EU's association agreements can offer free movement 
similar to that enjoyed by EU Member States. Mobility under FTAs, though 
broader in scope in comparison to that under GATS, is nevertheless highly 
restricted. And while access to employment is available under, for example, 
the EU-Ukraine AA, it comes at the price of losing a degree of sovereignty 
over national legislation. Future mobility negotiations may thus be limited to 
two alternatives: almost no mobility or some free movement in exchange of 
regulatory approximation. As will be discussed below, the UK Government 
seems to tend towards the first option. 
C. UK's Mode 4 Access post-Brexit 
The White Paper envisages Mode 4 access as part of the post-Brexit 
immigration system: 
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We are also willing to expand, on a reciprocal basis, our current range of 
"GATS Mode 4" commitments which we have taken as part of EU trade 
deals.121  
Exactly how this is to be done, the White Paper does not make clear. Due to 
CETA's negative listing method, 'GATS+' mobility can be seen as mobility 
under CETA. It is thus possible that the drafters of the White Paper had in 
mind CETA Mode 4 access with a negative listing method (at least in part). 
Before addressing the similarities between the system proposed in the White 
Paper and CETA, it is important to re-emphasise a significant difference. 
Labour mobility rights under CETA (like under any other typical FTA and 
like GATS Mode 4 access) do not cover routes which lead to permanent 
employment, nor do they regulate rights to residence or social rights. As 
mentioned before, the White Paper does establish a route for skilled workers 
to come to the UK for longer periods which may lead to settlement. CETA, 
like other FTAs, provides only for short-term business access. CETA 'carves 
out' temporary business visits from the general visa regime under the EU's 
Schengen Agreement, but the general visa-regime remains (e.g. for workers). 
While the White Paper does not provide detailed categories of post-Brexit 
Mode 4 access (these will be subject to negotiations for reciprocal rights), it 
does indicate that future access may cover independent professionals, 
contractual service suppliers, intra company transfers and business visitors – 
that is, the categories designated under CETA  for Mode 4 rights. According 
to the White Paper: 
By agreeing 'Mode 4' commitments in future free trade agreements, trading 
partners can provide service industries with greater certainty as to their 
ability to move key personnel across borders to supply services and fulfil 
contracts.122 
As for how long persons have access under CETA mobility rights, that 
depends on the category of persons. For example, as noted above, senior 
personnel intra-corporate transferees are allowed to stay in the contracting 
state up to three years, whereas graduate trainees cannot stay longer than one 
year. 
 
121 The White Paper, para 5, p 12. 
122 Ibid. para 6.75. 
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The White Paper sets a general visitors' stay period of a maximum of six 
months. It is estimated that over 95 per cent of business visits from EEA 
nationals are for less than 15 days, which is an indication that the vast majority 
of business visits will likely be unaffected by a maximum six-month duration 
for visits. However, the White Paper leaves open the possibility of changing 
the current policy in relation to EEA nationals in line with economic needs. 
The Mode 4 access laid out in the White Paper largely reflects the 
government's proposals stated in the July 2018 Chequers Plan. This 
document refers to a visa-free regime for short-term business visitors and 
intra-corporate transferees and states that the 'UK will also discuss how to 
facilitate temporary mobility of scientists and researchers, self-employed 
professionals, employees providing services, as well as investors'.123 The 
guiding principle is that of reciprocity; the UK will 'seek reciprocal mobility 
arrangements with the EU, building on current WTO GATS 
commitments'.124 
2. Most-Favoured-Nation Clause 
Lastly, an important feature of FTAs (e.g. CETA, the EU-South Korea FTA, 
and others) is the 'most-favoured-nation' (MFN) clause. An MFN clause is a 
non-discrimination requirement.125 It means that if you provide some 
favourable treatment to one trading partner, you have to give it to all partners 
who benefit from an MFN clause. Thus, any commitments which parties to 
the CETA afford under other agreements must also be extended under 
CETA. An MFN clause also largely applies to provisions on temporary entry 
and stay of natural persons. Article 9.5 of CETA states that the MFN 
obligation applies to trade in services, except if a measure provides for, among 
 
123 The 2018 July Chequers Brexit plan, para 81, p 33. 
124 Ibid. para 76, p 33. 
125 Art 1(1) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 entitled 'General 
Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment' states that 'any advantage, favour, privilege or 
immunity granted by any contracting party to any product originating in or 
destined for any other country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally 
to the like product originating in or destined for the territories of all other 
contracting parties'. 
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other things, 'recognition' (i.e. acceptance of each other's standards, such as 
professional qualifications, as sufficient).  
MFN exemptions are listed separately and primarily arise due to preferential 
agreements outside the WTO framework. This may explain why, for 
example, the EU reserves the right to discriminate in favour of Switzerland in 
a number of areas. The EU may be 'grandfathering' (e.g. carving out from its 
GATS commitments) sectoral deals with Switzerland that existed before 
1994. It is as yet unclear whether the UK and EU will want to 'grandfather' 
preferences post-Brexit. This will depend on whether the EU and UK will 
agree on a preferential treatment for labour mobility. 
It is also unclear what impact an MFN clause under the UK's free trade 
agreements will have on the future EU-UK agreement. As noted above, the 
White Paper emphasises that the dual immigration policy will be replaced by 
a single policy which treats EU and non-EU nationals alike. Even if the UK 
were to decide to change its red lines and afford EU nationals rights reflecting 
those currently enjoyed under the free movement provisions, an MFN clause 
under CETA should not be a barrier since Annex II of CETA establishes 
additional reservations applicable in the EU, one of which states that the EU 
reserves the right to adopt an agreement with a third country which creates 
an internal market in services and investment. Even if no such reservations 
existed, it is questionable whether the EU's trading partners would find it 
practical to challenge larger benefits under a future EU-UK deal. As it 
currently stands, however, an MFN clause will probably not be relevant with 
respect to the future UK-EU mobility agreement, given the emphasis placed 
in the White Paper on a 'single policy for all' approach. 
To conclude, international mobility rules are far removed from the free 
movement concept under EU law. Mode 4 access under GATS is about 
temporary provision of services within a limited list of services and while 
Mode 4 under FTAs typically covers more services, it too is restrictive in 
nature. Mobility under association agreements may offer broader routes for 
access, but comes with the requirement to abide by EU's rules and 
regulations. Leaving the EU but being obliged to follow its rules is hardly the 
result that would appeal to either Leave or Remain proponents. It is 
therefore unsurprising that the current position of the UK government (at 
least as developed under Theresa May's administration), is to fall back on 
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Mode 4 access in its future relationship with the EU. This option, however, 
will greatly disappoint those who see value in free movement. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
The future UK immigration regime is a multi-dimensional puzzle. Despite 
the announcement of a single regime for all immigrants post-Brexit, the 
reality will be quite different. There will be differences in the applicable 
regime depending on when a given EU/EEA/Swiss national arrived in the UK. 
Firstly, there will be those EU/EEA/Swiss nationals (and their family 
members) who arrived before exit day and/or by the end of the transition 
period, who will have settled or pre-settled status which broadly resembles 
the right to permanent residence under EU law. Secondly, there will be those 
EU/EEA/Swiss nationals arriving after exit day and/or the end of the 
transition period but before the new regime applies with Euro TLR. A third 
category will be those to whom this new regime will apply. While the White 
Paper has mapped out the shape of that regime, it is contingent on what 
happens in any future EU-UK trade negotiations, assuming they happen at 
all. The current position of the UK government suggests that Brexit will lead 
to an end of free movement. Whether a highly restricted Mode 4-type access 
or mobility under some form of association with the EU is chosen for the 
future relationship, it will not offer free movement accompanied by the right 
to equal treatment. That is the benefit of EU membership. 
An end to free movement is a significant change from a legal, practical, and 
human rights perspective. EU citizens will no longer have unlimited access to 
the job market in the UK and will have to compete with other third-country 
nationals. Even if they are accepted in the UK, they will no longer benefit 
from equal treatment, including in the area of social protection. The EU 
citizenship rights of approximately one million British nationals living in the 
EU will also be taken away, since Brexit entails the loss of their EU 
citizenship. Overall, Brexit will diminish the rights of around half a billion 
people. For those who voted for Brexit, this is clearly good; 'Remainers' 
might not agree. Meanwhile in the complexity of individual people's lives, 
Brexit will create uncertainty and, inevitably, litigation.
